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  Since the early Reagan years, critics have argued that benefit-cost analysis is used by the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a one-sided tool of deregulation to advance 
the interests of business.  This article discloses a little-known fact:  OMB also plays a powerful 
pro-regulation role when agency proposals address market failures and are supported by benefit-
cost analysis.  Drawing on four case studies from the George W. Bush Administration, the author 
examines how and why OMB encouraged regulatory initiatives while protecting some 
rulemakings from opposition by forces inside and outside of the executive branch.  The case 
studies address the labeling of foods for trans fat content, control of diesel engine exhaust, 
improvement of light-truck fuel economy, and control of air pollution from coal-fired power 
plants. OMB’s role in the 2001-2006 period was unusual by historic standards because, rather 
than await agency drafts, OMB played a pro-active role in both the initiation of rulemakings and 
the creation of regulatory alternatives for consideration.   The benefit-cost framework could be 
much more powerful if greater investments were made in applied research to expand knowledge 
on key regulatory issues.   3
INTRODUCTION 
 
            On New Year’s Eve of 2001, after the disputed Florida recount, I received a call from 
the Bush-Cheney transition team.  They asked me to consider a senior regulatory post in the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the largest unit within the Executive Office of the 
President.   
 
  The call was a pleasant surprise since I had not been involved in the Bush-Cheney 
campaign.  In fact, I answered gingerly a question about why I made a financial contribution 
to Elizabeth Dole’s short-lived 2000 presidential campaign.   
 
  Having taught benefit-cost analysis for seventeen years at the Harvard School of 
Public Health, the opportunity to practice what I was preaching was intriguing.  And my own 
scholarship on regulation of health risks had called for a more rigorous approach to selecting 
regulatory priorities, weighing risks, and devising cost-effective solutions (Graham and 
Wiener, 1995; Graham, 1997). Thus, I accepted the offer to serve with hopes of advancing 
the practice of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory policy making. 
 
  After going through a meticulous FBI background check, I was nominated in March 
2001 to be the President’s “regulatory czar” -- the Administrator of OMB’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).      
 
  The Senate confirmation process was my introduction to hardball politics in 
Washington, DC. A coalition of liberal activists opposed my nomination with provocative 
rhetoric, but their allegations were effectively countered in the confirmation process (U.S. 
Congress, 2001).  I was both encouraged and humbled when so many of my academic 
colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, voiced support for my nomination.  In July 
2001, I was confirmed by the Senate and went to work leading 50 career policy analysts at 
OIRA.   
 
  OIRA’s role in federal regulation has been controversial. Since the early Reagan 
years, critics have argued that benefit-cost analysis is used by OMB as a one-sided tool of 
deregulation to advance the interests of business. A variety of regulatory scholars and pro-
regulation activists have raised concerns about the role of OIRA, especially as applied to 
public health, safety and environmental issues (Andrews, 1984; Morrison 1986; Percival, 
1991; McGarity, 1998).  Some argue that health protection is an absolute right, even though it 
is difficult to base such a claim on modern philosophical theories (Schroeder, 1986).  They 
also fear a transfer of power from the regulators to OMB, since the civil servants working at 
the mission-oriented agencies tend to be more zealous about regulation than the policy 
analysts at OMB (McGarity, 1991; Moe and Wilson, 1994).   
  
    As I entered a pro-business Republican administration, I expected that my office 
would work to stop bad rules and find less costly ways for regulators to achieve worthy public 
objectives (e.g., environmental protection).  And we did so.   
 
  My purpose in this article is to disclose a little-known fact:  Benefit-cost analysis also 
caused OIRA to be a pro-regulation advocate in the Bush administration.  I support this claim  
by providing specific examples of how and why OIRA became a voice – usually an effective 
one – for sensible pro-regulation initiatives that addressed risks created by business activity.     4
 
  I begin with a short description of the federal regulatory process, with an emphasis on 
the basis for OIRA’s participation in agency rulemaking.  I then offer four case studies that 
illustrate how OIRA worked with   the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on 
labeling foods for trans fat content, the Department of Transportation (DOT) on improving 
light-truck fuel economy, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on controlling 
diesel engine exhaust and reducing air pollution from coal-fired power plants.  I conclude with 
some suggestions about how science and economics can play a stronger role in federal 
regulation in the years ahead.       
 
OMB AND THE REGULATORS 
 
  Federal regulatory agencies develop rules based on legislative authority that has been 
delegated to them by the U.S. Congress.  Since 1981, the Executive Office of the President 
has insisted that all major new regulations be supported by a benefit-cost analysis, including 
an analysis of the potential market failure that motivates the need for rulemaking (Smith, 
1984).  It is now well accepted that, based on presidential executive order, OMB has authority 
to oversee the regulatory activities of federal agencies to ensure that presidential policies are 
followed and that economic analysis is undertaken to inform regulatory policy (Kagan, 2001; 
West, 2005).   
 
  In order to bring discipline to the regulatory approval process, OMB requires agencies 
to submit any significant rulemaking proposal to OIRA for “clearance” before it is published in 
the Federal Register (Blumstein, 2001; GAO 2003). The heart of OMB’s power, as 
administered by OIRA, is to “return” a draft rule to an agency for further “consideration” 
(OMB, 2002).  An agency can overrule OIRA only by a successful appeal to the OMB 
Director (or the President).   
 
  OIRA does not enforce a strict, numeric benefit-cost test.  Although OIRA tracks the 
numbers carefully, it also considers qualitative claims about possible benefits and costs as 
well as a variety of non-efficiency arguments (e.g., matters of fairness).   For example, a civil-
rights rule may be proposed on philosophic grounds that have nothing to do with economic 
efficiency.  Agencies must explain why benefits “justify” costs but the showing does not have 
to be fully monetary.  Since there is no rigorous analytic tool for weighing qualitative benefits 
or fairness claims, OIRA review of regulations inevitably entails some policy judgment (OMB, 
2002). 
 
  The key limitation on OIRA’s authority is that OIRA may not compel a regulator to take 
a position that is inconsistent with the regulator’s legislative authority.  If OIRA induces an 
agency to make such a mistake, the resulting rule is flawed and may be overturned by a 
federal court.  Thus, a complex interaction between economic, legal and fairness 
considerations, coupled with interest-group pressures, defines the negotiations between 
OIRA and the regulators (McGarity, 1991; Morgenstern, 1997).       
           
  In the summer of 2001, my boss, OMB Director Mitch Daniels (now the Governor of 
Indiana), explained to me his views on why OMB should oversee the regulators.  He said that 
just as no modern President has permitted a Cabinet department to set its own budget 
without OMB review, no recent President has permitted federal regulators to impose off-
budget expenditures – typically “unfunded mandates” on businesses or states – without   5
review by analysts in the Executive Office of the President.  Yet Daniels also stressed that 
OIRA could do a good job only if it engaged in careful consideration of benefits as well as 
costs.  
 
  In order to demonstrate OIRA’s backbone, Daniels urged me to move quickly to return 
some bad or poorly-reasoned rulemaking proposals to agencies.    I signed more than twenty 
of these official return letters in my first year on the job (OMB, 2002). That is more than the 
overall number of returns in eight years of the Clinton Administration, but a much lower return 
rate than in the Reagan years (Power and Schlesinger, 2002). Once the regulators realized 
that I was willing to exercise this power, it became far less necessary to use it.  We were able 
to work out problems with an agency in advance, without the need for any public rebuke. 
 
  To make it easier for regulators to understand OIRA’s analytic perspective, we 
published a formal guidance document (“OMB Circular A-4”) that outlines what OIRA expects 
to see in a regulatory analysis, especially the benefit-cost evaluation.  This document, which 
is available on OMB’s web site, was finalized only after OIRA made revisions to a draft 
document that was subjected to public comment and expert peer review by academics and 
other scholars on regulatory policy (OMB, 2003).  I turn now to the four case studies of OIRA 
at work with the regulators. 
 
LABELING FOODS FOR TRANS-FAT CONTENT 
          
            Soon after taking office, one of my senior career staff who covered HHS brought to 
my attention a rulemaking that was started in the Clinton Administration but had never been 
finished.  That was hardly a rare situation, but my economics staff insisted that this 
rulemaking was permissible under existing law and a good idea.   
 
  The proposal, which had been drafted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
would have compelled food companies to include the trans-fat content on the food label, just 
as calories and saturated-fat content are disclosed.  FDA’s economists argued that a variety 
of informational obstacles were preventing the market from responding to the dangers of 
trans-fats.  They believed that the new label would not only aid consumer choice but also 
encourage food processors to reduce the trans-fat content of a variety of widely-consumed 
foods.  FDA projected that the annual health benefits of the rule, measured in less heart 
disease, would far exceed the annual burdens, which included the costs of food-processing 
modifications and labeling changes (FDA, 2003).   
 
            The key scientific premise was that trans-fat consumption is linked to the 
development of coronary heart disease.  To verify this premise, I asked my staff to consult 
the recent medical literature and reach out to three groups:  the Department of Nutrition at the 
Harvard School of Public Health, the International Life Sciences Institute (a scientific group 
affiliated with the food industry), and the Center for Science in the Public Interest (a non-profit 
advocacy group).  All of these consultations reinforced our conviction that FDA’s scientific 
premise was sound. 
 
            When the OIRA desk officer checked with FDA, we learned that the rulemaking was 
moving at a snail’s pace, in part because a new FDA Commissioner had not yet been 
nominated. In order to accelerate this rulemaking, we developed a tool which we called the 
“prompt letter”.  It was intended to be a polite nudge -- a suggestion that an agency give   6
priority to a matter, or alternatively, explain to OMB in a public reply letter why it should not be 
a priority (OMB, 2002).   
 
  The lawyers in the White House disliked the idea. They argued that a prompt letter 
revealed too much about preliminary thinking inside the executive branch and might be seen 
as compromising OIRA’s objectivity in the subsequent review of a rule.  However, Director 
Daniels did not find these objections convincing, and gave us the go ahead.   
 
  We issued the first OIRA prompt letter to the FDA in the fall of 2001.  FDA responded 
by finishing the final rule, and trans-fat content is now a standard entry on food labels (FDA, 
2003).   As a result of this rulemaking, grocery store shelves became filled with foods low in 
trans fat content and a variety of restaurants and food establishments are also taking new 
steps to reduce trans-fat content. 
 
From 2001 to 2006, I signed more than a dozen of these prompt letters, which are 
posted on OMB’s web site (www.whitehouse/omb.eop.gov).  Prompt letters were praised as 
an important innovation by some commentators outside the government (Hahn and Sunstein, 
2002), even though they are not legally binding on agencies.  They were less popular at the 
regulatory agencies.  With some justification, agencies asked why OIRA didn’t simply convey 
its suggestions to them informally.  
 
Indeed, later in my tenure at OIRA, my staff persuaded me that we could often achieve 
the same result we had achieved on trans-fats by simply scheduling a meeting with a 
regulator, where the topic might be a draft prompt letter or a draft return letter. Nonetheless, I 
favor public prompt letters from OIRA because they exemplify the transparency in 
government that I believe will increase public trust in OIRA (GAO, 2003; Graham, Noe and 
Branch, 2006). The public nature of the prompt letters also encourages outside groups to 
suggest promising topics for prompt letters to OIRA and serves as an occasional reminder of 
the need for OIRA staff to address shortages as well as excesses of regulation.   
 
The development of the prompt letter and its application to FDA’s trans-fat rule may be 
an important event in the history of OIRA, regardless of how many future prompt letters are 
issued.  It reaffirmed in a public way that OIRA’s role is to advance the cause of “smart 
regulation”, which sometimes will lead to more rather than less regulation (OMB, 2002).  
Some scholars have suggested that there should be a presidential executive order to codify 
OIRA’s power to issue prompt letters (Hahn and Sunstein, 2002; Bagley and Revesz, 2006).      
 
CURBING DIESEL ENGINE EXHAUST 
 
In late 2000, the Clinton Administration issued a flood of new regulations, including an 
ambitious rule under the Clean Air Act to reduce diesel exhaust from heavy-duty trucks 
operated on roads and highways.  The goal was a 90% diesel-exhaust reduction to be 
accomplished as refineries reduce the sulfur content of diesel fuel and engine suppliers add 
modern emission control equipment.     
 
When President Bush took office in 2001, some analysts in the conservative think tank 
community saw in the new Republican administration a potential opportunity to delay, modify 
or rescind the highway diesel rule (OMB, 2001).  And, in fact, the new policy officials at EPA 
were asked by some industry officials to reconsider the rule.     7
 
Deciding Whether to Retain the Highway Diesel Rule 
 
The highway diesel rule was certainly costly, imposing annualized expenses of $3 to 
$5 billion per year on refineries and engine suppliers (OMB, 2002).  Those estimates 
assumed that the industry would experience a steady decline in variable costs over time as 
refiners learned how to implement desulphurization at a lower cost.  The costs were a bitter 
pill for an industry that had been downsizing for years.  In the 1990s, many small refineries 
struggled to break even. 
 
Despite the significant costs, what impressed me about the rule was the in-depth 
benefits analysis prepared by EPA.  The rule was projected to prevent, each year, 8,300 
premature deaths, 5,500 cases of chronic bronchitis and 361,400 asthma attacks.  When the 
benefits were expressed in monetary units, they were roughly 20 times larger than the 
estimated costs (OMB, 2002).  Moreover, EPA scientists indicated that some of the important 
human health and ecological benefits were not even included in the benefit calculation 
because of gaps in scientific knowledge or uncertainty about how to express the benefits in 
monetary units (EPA, 2004).  
 
From an economic perspective, the producers, buyers and users of diesel engines 
were creating a classic negative externality:  the health risks to people breathing diesel 
exhaust were not fully considered in market transactions.   
 
Much to the dismay of some White House staff, we decided against reopening the 
highway diesel rule (OMB, 2001).  In fact, rather than delay or rescind the rule, in 2002 OIRA 
began work on a draft prompt letter calling for EPA to undertake a similar rulemaking that 
reduce exhaust from numerous off-road engines used in construction, agriculture and 
mining.   
 
Reducing Exhaust from Off-Road Engines 
 
When we met with EPA informally on the draft prompt, they insisted that there was no 
need for a prompt because the rulemaking was already a priority.  They were also pleased to 
learn about OIRA’s pro-regulation perspective.  We therefore agreed to undertake an 
unprecedented EPA-OMB rulemaking “collaboration”, which was announced via press 
releases in June 2002 by both EPA and OMB.        
 
The complex rulemaking, which required a 90% reduction in diesel exhaust from off-
road engines, was completed more quickly than is typical of large EPA rules (EPA, 2004).  
The rule was costly ($1.3 billion per year) but the estimated ratio of monetary benefit to cost 
was over 20 to 1.   
 
In the course of this rulemaking, we asked EPA to undertake an analysis of benefits to 
determine how likely it was that benefits would prove to be large or small.  The point of this 
probability analysis was to account for the key scientific uncertainties in the health and 
environmental sciences.  
 
Interestingly, the analysis revealed that the benefits of the rule exceeded the costs, 
even when the most pessimistic assumptions were applied to the benefits assessment.  This   8
result caused us to ask whether the rule should be made even more stringent. However, a 
consensus emerged that requiring more than 90% sulfur removal raised feasibility concerns 
and might lead to unintended yet adverse consequences (Graham and Wiener, 1995). 
 
The EPA-OMB collaboration did lead to some controversy.  We asked whether trading 
of emissions-control credits should be permitted between off-road and highway engines, 
since a broader trading regime might make both rules even more cost-effective.  OMB and 
EPA lawyers agreed that such trading authority might place the entire rule at legal risk, since 
the Clean Air Act has no express authority for such an expansive trading regime.   Disruptive 
litigation could cause delays in implementation and lack of predictability for firms expected to 
make large capital investments.  So we retreated to a more modest request that trading of 
credits be permitted among engines of different sizes within the same off-road engine family.  
EPA agreed to this request.   
 
As this rulemaking was nearing a conclusion in 2004, one of the more satisfying 
moments for me occurred when EPA officials were briefing skeptical White House staff about 
why EPA was undertaking a billion-dollar regulation that was not the subject of any statutory 
deadline from Congress.  Meeting participants turned to me: I explained that the rule had an 
impressive benefit-cost case, and the meeting did not last much longer. 
 
Enforcing Diesel Exhaust Rules 
 
Writing stringent rules is not useful if businesses do not believe they will be enforced.  
In 1999, EPA and diesel-engine suppliers reached a settlement on an enforcement action 
that alleged that some suppliers had installed computer software that turns off emission 
controls when a heavy truck is operated on the highway.  As part of the settlement, the 
suppliers agreed to an accelerated compliance schedule for their new, cleaner engines being 
developed under the 2000 highway diesel rule.   
 
As the accelerated deadline approached in October 2002, several companies informed 
EPA that they might need a delay in the effective date; other companies indicated they were 
ready to go.  EPA made a strong case to us that delay was out of the question, and we 
agreed.   
 
The following question then arose:  How large should the noncompliance penalties be 
for a manufacturer that offers for sale a noncompliant engine?  According to the applicable 
law, the penalty must be set to ensure that no manufacturer gains a competitive advantage 
from noncompliance.  In addition to potential savings in research and development (R+D) and 
equipment costs from noncompliance, OIRA felt it was critical that any fuel economy gain 
over the long life of the noncompliant engine be included in the penalty.  Thus, OIRA staff 
worked closely with EPA staff to produce a rule that imposed large penalties for 
noncompliance, including the proper discounting of future fuel savings (EPA, 2002). 
 
As our policy leaked to the affected companies, the chief of EPA’s clean-air office and 
I were called to a meeting with members of Congress who were concerned about these non-
compliance penalties.  EPA was asked why the agency was harassing industry with 
regulatory fines, especially with such little notice.  As the meeting progressed, it became 
apparent that the members intended to make EPA the villain.  I listened carefully but, without 
disclosing our thinking, suggested that there were much better targets than this rule for efforts   9
to reduce the burdens of bad regulation.  Once again, I was gratified that sound economic 
thinking prevailed, without any changes to the non-compliance penalties. 
 
After the grilling on Capitol Hill, Director Daniels called me into his office for a briefing.  
I explained that we needed a policy that rewarded rather than punished innovators in the 
industry.  Daniels offered this advice:  “Get the rule out as quickly as possible.  Undue delay 
allows lobbyists to bill more hours as they apply political pressure.”  That proved to be good 
advice, which we used on various occasions in the future. 
 
PROMOTING MORE FUEL-EFFICIENT VEHICLES 
  
The run-up of fuel prices in 2001 underscored why the Vice President’s energy task 
force, which was devising a national energy policy for the President, was interested in ways 
to spur conservation of oil.  The U.S. was becoming more heavily dependent on foreign 
sources of oil (EIA, 2005), and the transportation sector was America’s biggest source of oil 
consumption.  
 
The market-failure rationales for oil conservation were a matter of dispute inside the 
Bush administration.  Some analysts argued that the U.S. was such a large consumer of 
world oil that we could check the “monopoly” pricing power of OPEC through a concerted 
program to reduce US oil consumption.  Others argued that oil consumption was under-
priced because world oil prices do not fully reflect national security concerns or the damages 
from carbon dioxide emissions that are implicated in global climate change. Still others 
speculated that consumer decisions about vehicle fuel economy reflected irrationally high 
discount rates on future gasoline expenses.  Although there was no universal agreement as 
to which market imperfections were most important, there was a broad consensus that a 
national policy aimed at curbing U.S. oil consumption was required.   
 
Recognizing that cars and light trucks accounted for the majority of oil use in the U.S. 
transportation sector, the Vice President’s energy task force made two key recommendations 
to enhance vehicle fuel economy (White House 2001).   First, Congress should offer tax 
credits to consumers who purchase cars and light trucks with innovative fuel-saving 
technologies (e.g., hybrid engines).   Second, DOT should reexamine the Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy program (CAFE), which sets mileage rules for new vehicles, to determine 
whether CAFE should be reformed or replaced with a more market-based approach to oil 
savings.  Some White House economists argued instead for higher fuel taxes or carbon 
taxes, but tax hikes were considered political suicide in Congress.   
 
The Science and Politics of CAFE 
 
In 2001, the CAFE program was moribund.  Although in 1974 Congress had granted 
DOT authority to set mileage rules for cars and light trucks, in 1996 a bipartisan coalition in 
Congress began adding “riders” to DOT appropriations bills each year that froze CAFE 
standards at 27.5 miles per gallon (MPG) for cars and 20.7 MPG for light trucks (SUVs, vans 
and pick-up trucks).  As a result, the combined fuel economy of cars and light trucks was 
about 25 MPG in model year 2004, unchanged from ten years earlier (EPA, 2006).   
 
The environmentalists in Congress were arguing for large increases in CAFE 
standards, but they were outnumbered by members of Congress who feared that large CAFE   10
increases would harm the economy, especially the auto industry.  The dispute was less a 
partisan fight than a regional and interest-group struggle.  Leading Democrats such as Carl 
Levin of Michigan and Dick Gephardt of Missouri opposed large CAFE increases; prominent 
Republicans such as John McCain of Arizona and Olympia Snowe of Maine favored stricter 
mileage rules.   
 
A window of opportunity opened in August 2001 when a committee of the National 
Academy of Sciences released a major study of the CAFE program (NAS, 2001).  Chaired by 
Dr. Paul Portney of Resources for the Future, this committee concluded that reform of the 
CAFE standards could save more energy, reduce safety risks to motorists and minimize 
compliance costs.  While tighter CAFE standards for cars had saved fuel in the 1980s, NAS 
found that those same standards had caused adverse safety consequences among motorists 
due to the downsizing of cars.  NAS suggested that size- or weight-based CAFE standards 
replace the uniform, fleet-wide mileage standards.  In order to enhance economic efficiency, 
NAS also recommended that the separate CAFE programs for domestic cars, imported cars 
and light trucks be combined into a single program and that permission be granted for 
manufacturers to trade CAFE compliance credits. 
 
At about the same time, vehicle manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) 
union were beginning to realize what they were up against in California, where the state 
legislature passed a CAFE-like bill aimed at reducing carbon-dioxide emissions from vehicles 
sold in California.  Other states in the northeast began to follow California’s lead.  The 
prospect of a proliferation of state CAFE programs was frightening to all elements of the 
industry.  Reluctantly, industry leaders began to realize that a revitalized federal CAFE 
program was far better than putting California and various states in charge of national auto 
policy.    
 
Inside the White House, the President’s legislative-affairs team was skeptical about 
whether any CAFE-related proposal could pass the Congress.  Despite their reservations, the 
decision was made to allow DOT to ask Congress to lift the freeze on CAFE standards and 
provide DOT with new regulatory authority to implement the NAS suggestions.   
 
The DOT proposal to reform CAFE went nowhere in the Congress.  There was never 
even a vote on the House or Senate floor concerning the NAS reforms.  Why?  All of the 
stakeholders – the environmentalists, UAW, vehicle manufacturers and consumer groups – 
were opposed to giving DOT this broad new authority.  As one auto lobbyist told me:  “The 
devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know.”  Although Congress would not budge 
on the NAS reforms, they did lift the freeze on CAFE standards beginning with model year 
2004. 
 
Tightening the Mileage Rules 
 
After this legislative debacle, I was asked by the White House to lead an interagency 
team charged with reforming CAFE administratively.  Our charge was to implement as many 
of the NAS reforms as permitted under existing legal authority.  In addition to DOT, the team 
included OIRA, the Department of Energy (DOE), EPA, the Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA), the Council on Environmental Quality, the Vice President’s office and the White 
House policy offices.   
   11
We began by tightening mileage standards for light trucks under the existing CAFE 
framework, while emphasizing the need to reform CAFE in the long run (DOT, 2003).  For 
model years 2005 through 2007, DOT gradually increased light-truck mileage rules from 20.7 
MPG to 22.2 MPG.  Although the rule was estimated to cost the industry (primarily GM and 
Ford) more than $1 billion per year, the benefit-cost analysis showed that the net financial 
impact on consumers would be beneficial, even assuming that fuel prices stayed around 
$1.50 gallon through 2020. Although the extra 1.5 MPG may sound small, it represents a 
savings of more than 4 billion gallons of fuel over the life of the affected vehicles – even 
accounting for the fact that some consumers drive more miles when their vehicles become 
more fuel efficient.   
 
A key assumption in the DOT analysis was that both the private and external benefits 
of fuel savings should be counted.  DOT analysts had learned that there was some low-
hanging fruit in the engineering of fuel economy, in part because CAFE standards had been 
frozen for almost a decade and in part because, they speculated, many consumers apply 
irrationally large discount rates to future fuel savings.  DOT did consider the possibility that 
tighter mileage standards might reduce new vehicle sales, but this effect was found to be 
insignificant.   
 
A breakthrough on one of the NAS recommendations occurred in 2003 when the 
lawyers on the interagency team discovered that DOT already had the authority to adopt 
size-based CAFE standards for light trucks (but not for cars).  This oddity in the way the 1974 
CAFE law was written allowed us to develop stricter, size-based standards for the fastest 
growing and least fuel-efficient segment of the vehicle market:  light trucks.  
 
Using this reform authority, DOT gradually tightened MPG targets for light trucks from 
2008 through 2011. The long time horizon of the rulemaking provided a degree of regulatory 
certainty for vehicle makers and the opportunity to consider more innovative compliance 
technologies (e.g., hybrid engines and advanced diesel engines).     
 
DOT projected that the CAFE rulemakings covering model years 2005 to 2011 will 
boost overall light-truck fuel economy to 24.0 MPG by 2011, about 16% higher than the level 
prevailing when President Bush took office (DOT, 2006).  DOT also projected that more than 
ten billion gallons of fuel will be saved.   The benefit-cost analysis was favorable (see Table 
1), in part because in 2005 the Energy Information Administration raised the long-term fuel-
price projection for 2020 from $1.50 per gallon to $2.10 per gallon (EIA, 2005).   Since private 
fuel savings are counted in the DOT analysis, a higher projected fuel price causes higher 
benefit estimates for those technologies that manufacturers do not plan to implement 
voluntarily.   
 
For the first time in the history of the CAFE program, DOT set the stringency of the 
CAFE standards at the point where marginal benefits equaled marginal costs.  In setting the 
MPG targets, no consideration was given to the financial condition of Ford and GM compared 
to Toyota and the other vehicle manufacturers.  Thus, the financial-affordability test used 
previously by DOT was replaced by net-benefit maximization, a reform that resulted in stricter 
standards than would have resulted if DOT had taken into account the dismal financial 
condition of GM and Ford.   
 
    12
The Rationale for Size-Based Reform  
 
For model years 2008 through 2011, DOT reformed the CAFE system so that the 
stringency of a manufacturer’s CAFE standard was adjusted based on the size distribution of 
new vehicles in the company’s fleet.  Since it is generally easier to achieve good fuel 
economy in a small rather than a large vehicle, small vehicles were assigned tougher MPG 
targets than large ones.   
 
The size-based reform had several policy advantages (DOT, 2006).  Fortunately, at 
least one of these advantages appealed to each of the main stakeholders. 
 
First, reform reduced the safety concerns raised by NAS because any vehicle 
downsizing would cause the vehicle to be assigned a stricter MPG target.  Instead of 
downsizing vehicles, which would save fuel by reducing vehicle weight, manufacturers were 
encouraged to comply by adopting innovative technology.  Since the reform was based on a 
vehicle’s dimensions (called “footprint” in the auto business), not weight per se, innovative 
light-weight materials remained a viable compliance strategy.    
 
Second, the new size metric created a more level playing field for vehicle 
manufacturers.  This was a critical issue to the UAW, GM and Ford because Toyota and 
other competitors were beginning to challenge the dominance of Ford and GM in the market 
for large SUVs and pick-up trucks.  And in previous years, Toyota had accumulated large 
amounts of CAFE credits by competing only in the market for smaller SUVs.   In other words, 
if GM and Ford can survive their near-term financial troubles, there is no reason to believe 
that the size-based CAFE standards for model years 2008 to 2011 will place them at a long-
term competitive disadvantage.     
 
Third, the smallest SUVs were subjected to roughly the same MPG targets as large 
passenger cars.  No longer did the designation “light truck” provide more lenient regulatory 
treatment than the “car” designation.  As a result, there was no perverse regulatory incentive 
for companies to offer SUVs or mini-vans instead of large sedans or station wagons.  And 
there was no perverse incentive to raise the ground clearance of a vehicle, possibly creating 
rollover risks, in order to achieve the “light truck” classification. 
 
Finally, reform saved more fuel because all vehicle manufacturers were induced to 
innovate.  Moreover, the scope of the program was expanded to include large passenger 
SUVs (e.g., the Hummer) that had previously been exempt from MPG standards.  DOT 
considered the possibility that the size-based formula might encourage companies to offer 
larger vehicles, but this outcome seemed unlikely due to the cost of larger vehicle platforms 
and the growing consumer interest in car-like SUVs. 
 
An Appeal to the President 
 
In 2005 there was some last-minute second guessing about CAFE reform.  As fuel 
prices ran over $3.00 per gallon for a brief period and the red ink in Detroit mushroomed, 
some White House staffers got cold feet about tighter CAFE standards.     
 
The dissenters advocated a return to the CAFE “freeze” of the 1990s based on two 
arguments.  First, “we don’t need CAFE anymore”, they argued, because high prices at the   13
pump will spur plenty of conservation.  Proponents of CAFE reform responded that long-term 
market prices will not fully account for concerns about energy and national security, the risks 
of climate change, and possible irrationalities in how consumers weigh fuel savings in 
purchasing decisions.  Second, dissenters argued that tighter CAFE standards might force 
GM and Ford into Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Proponents of CAFE reform responded that the 
stringency of CAFE standards should be set based on net benefits, not the financial fortunes 
of specific companies, especially since the new sized-based structure provided a level 
playing field for each manufacturer offering a vehicle of a specific size.     
 
The policy debate was waged in the Oval Office in early 2005.  President Bush 
decided to stay with CAFE reform.  Indeed, in his 2007 State of the Union message, 
President Bush called for even stricter mileage standards for both cars and light trucks over 
the next ten years under a size-based CAFE program informed by benefit-cost analysis.   
 
A Wedge Between Consumers and Producers? 
 
OIRA and CEA shared a concern that tighter CAFE standards could cause vehicle 
producers to build vehicles that consumers do not wish to purchase, especially if fuel prices 
decline more than expected in the years ahead.  Since fuel taxes are not likely to be 
increased, there is a danger that federal regulation will drive a wedge between what 
consumers want to purchase and what vehicle makers are required to produce under CAFE.  
The DOT analysis did not account for the utility losses to consumers who might prefer even 
larger engines, more interior volume, and other fuel-consuming comforts. 
 
As OIRA and DOT were completing the CAFE reform proposal in 2005, Congress 
finally passed consumer tax credits for fuel-efficient vehicles in the comprehensive energy 
bill.  Scheduled to take effect January 1, 2006, the scope of the credits was expanded at our 
request to include advanced diesel technology as well as hybrids and fuel cells.   Although 
consumer tax credits are far from a perfect response to the potential “wedge”, they may 
stimulate both consumers and producers to have more interest in fuel-saving innovation than 
would otherwise be the case.   
 
Thus, the portfolio of policies that OIRA sought is now operating on both the demand 
and supply side of the market for fuel economy.   The recent advances in hybrid engines and 
advanced diesel technology announced by Honda, Toyota, Ford, GM, Daimler-Chrysler and 
BMW have been encouraging.  As more experience with these policies accumulates, 
adjustments may need to be made in response to  economic realities. 
 
REDUCING AIR POLLUTION FROM COAL PLANTS 
 
One of President Bush’s unsuccessful legislative proposals, “The Clear Skies 
Initiative”, was an ambitious program to replace numerous federal and state clean-air 
programs with a national “cap-and-trade” program covering the electric utility industry.  The 
idea was to place a cap on total industry emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and 
mercury but to allow plants to trade emissions credits in order to keep the cost of the program 
as low as possible, just as had been done in the successful 1990 program to combat acid 
rain (Stavins, 1998). OIRA assisted EPA in preparing the benefit-cost analysis for Clear 
Skies, which called for a 70% reduction in the three pollutants over the next 15 years.   
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Clear Skies did not move in the Congress because it became embroiled in a political 
dispute about what should be done about the threat of global warming and the possibility of 
mercury “hot spots” (Vendantam, 2005).  As the prospects for passage of Clear Skies 
dwindled, the White House asked OIRA to work with EPA on regulations under existing 
authority to reduce coal-plant air pollution.   
 
As a result, two coordinated rulemakings were issued in 2005:  the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule (CAIR), which places caps on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions, and the 
Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), which places caps on mercury emissions.  The caps on 
sulfur and nitrogen emissions were designed to help states and local communities meet 
health-based air standards for ozone and particulates.  Without passage of Clear Skies, 
those caps could be applied only in states east of the Mississippi, where long-range transport 
of coal-plant pollution was significant.  The 50-state mercury program was grounded in a 
rarely-used provision of the 1970 Clean Air Act, even though litigation against this creative 
use of existing authority was expected.   
 
As a package, the two rulemakings were quite costly to businesses and consumers: 
CAIR was projected to cost almost $ 2 billion per year, while the controls on mercury were 
projected to cost an additional $750 million per year by 2020 (EPA, 2005ab).  The cost of 
both rules was minimized by the creation of trading markets, where plants facing high costs 
of control could purchase emissions credits from plants facing low costs of control.    
 
Surprisingly, the benefit-cost case is far weaker for CAMR than for CAIR, even though 
CAIR is far more costly.  This is because the evidence of benefits from mercury removal is 
quite weak.  As a result, OIRA exerted a pro-regulation role on CAIR, but worked hard to 
reduce the unnecessary economic burdens that otherwise might have been imposed by 




In regions of the country that do not meet EPA’s health-based air quality standards, it 
is often impossible to achieve healthy air without greater emissions reductions by sources in 
upwind states.    Using the Clean Air Act’s “good neighbor” authority, EPA was empowered to 
prevent one state from causing air quality problems in a downwind state.  
 
A regional cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide was 
established for 28 states and the District of Columbia. Under CAIR, overall emissions from 
power plants in the region were capped to ensure a 50% emission reduction by 2009-2010 
and a 65-70% reduction by 2015 (EPA, 2005a).   
 
The public health benefits of CAIR are estimated to be impressive (EPA, 2005a).  By 
2015, the reductions in particle concentrations (due largely to the sulfur controls) are 
projected to prevent 17,000 premature deaths, 8,700 cases of chronic bronchitis, 22,000 
nonfatal heart attacks, 10,500 hospitalizations, 1.7 million lost work days and 9.9 million days 
of restricted physical activity.  The health benefits from diminished ozone (smog) levels (due 
to nitrogen controls) are  less impressive but still substantial:  2,800 fewer hospital 
admissions for respiratory illnesses, 280 fewer emergency room visits for asthma, 690,000 
fewer days with restricted activity and 510,000 fewer days where children are absent from   15
school due to illnesses.  The number of premature deaths prevented by the nitrogen controls 
could be as large as 500 per year.   
 
When expressed in monetary units, the total benefits of the overall CAIR rule were 
estimated to eventually exceed $150 billion  per year.  The lion’s share of these benefits is 
attributable to the premature deaths prevented by the sulfur controls.  Thus the overall ratio of 
CAIR’s benefits to costs was on the order of 75 to 1.    
 
OIRA was skeptical of some of these figures.  In 2002 we asked EPA to perform an 
alternative analysis with a series of less optimistic assumptions.  The results were still 
encouraging.  The alternative benefit estimate was a factor of ten smaller than EPA’s 
preferred estimate, but the benefit-cost ratio of CAIR remained favorable.      
 
OIRA worked with EPA analysts to take a closer look at the incremental benefits and 
costs of controlling sulfur and nitrogen.  That inquiry suggested that sulfur emissions 
reductions beyond 70% would be defensible on benefit-cost grounds.  Indeed, OIRA had 
made the case – unsuccessfully – that the sulfur cap under Clear Skies should be tighter than 
what was proposed.   The benefit-cost case for additional controls on nitrogen dioxide 
(beyond a 70% reduction) was far less clear. 
 
The lawyers on the interagency team argued that the 2015 sulfur cap could not be set 
more stringently than a 70% reduction – even though it made good economic sense to do so 
-- without exposing the rule to legal risk.  Reductions larger than 70% could not be easily 
justified in court because additional reductions were not necessary to assist downwind states 
in achieving EPA’s standard of healthy air.  However, as EPA tightens the 24-hour air-quality 
standard for particulates, a tighter sulfur cap may become legally defensible in the years 
ahead (Eilperin, 2006). 
 
OIRA also urged EPA to include industrial as well as utility sources of sulfur and 
nitrogen dioxide in a broader cap-and-trade program, or in a tailored trading market for 
industrial sources.  Although there was substantial interest in this suggestion, the poor 





At the same time that OIRA was urging EPA to make CAIR as stringent as possible, 
OIRA was working hard to make sure that the CAMR rule was not overly stringent. OIRA was 
also working against those who believed that no federal mercury rule was necessary.   
 
Mercury in the Environment 
 
After mercury is emitted from the stack and deposited (e.g., during periods of rainfall), 
it is converted into a more toxic form (methyl mercury) and finds its way into water bodies.    
EPA scientists were concerned that people living near power plants might experience health 
risks from eating large amounts of (locally-caught) fish contaminated with mercury.    
 
The most sensitive individuals are pregnant women because of the neurotoxic effects 
of methyl mercury on the rapidly growing brain of the fetus.  In the 1990s many states   16
adopted fish advisories aimed at discouraging pregnant women from ingesting fish that might 
be contaminated with mercury.  Unfortunately, fish advisories are often ignored, sometimes 
because low-income, subsistence populations rely on locally-caught fish for their daily diet. 
 
About 4% to 8% of pregnant women in the United States have been shown to have 
mercury levels in their blood that exceed EPA’s safe concentration, the reference level set to 
protect the fetus and small child (EPA, 2005b).  Surveys show that these women consume 
predominantly marine fish.  However, there is no evidence that emissions from U.S. power 
plants are responsible for the elevated mercury levels in marine fish.   
 
The initial thinking at EPA was that strict mercury controls were necessary at every 
power plant to ensure that pregnant women living near plants were protected.  If an 80-90 
percent reduction in mercury emissions had been required at each plant, the cost could have 
been several billion dollars per year (Gayer and Hahn, 2005).  Indeed, the engineers from 
DOE and EPA were disputing whether such reductions were even technically feasible 
(especially for boilers that burn sub-bituminous and lignite coals).  OIRA and EPA looked 
hard for a more cost-effective policy alternative.      
 
A promising insight arose from the environmental science:  The non-elemental forms 
of mercury (e.g., oxidized and particulate mercury) are most likely to be deposited near 
plants, while the elemental form – the pure gas -- enters the global pool of mercury and can 
be deposited virtually anywhere in the world   It is very difficult and expensive to control 
elemental mercury.  Some plant-specific controls may be needed to address non-elemental 
mercury emissions, but a “cap-and-trade” program is most appropriate for pollutants (such as 
elemental mercury) that are rapidly dispersed and transported long distances.   
 
Reducing Mercury Emissions 
 
In the course of the rulemaking, EPA and OIRA discovered that CAIR, by itself (i.e., 
without CAMR), was quite effective in reducing mercury (EPA, 2005b) because the same 
controls used by utilities to reduce sulfur and nitrogen also reduce (non-elemental) mercury. 
Without CAIR or CAMR, EPA projected 45 to 47 tons per year of mercury emissions by 2020.  
CAIR alone was projected to reduce mercury emissions to 34 tons by 2020.  Thus, at no 
extra cost, the CAIR rule was projected to cut overall mercury emissions by 26%.  More 
importantly, emissions of non-elemental mercury, which tend to deposit locally, were 
projected to decline by 55% (from 22 to 10 tons per year by 2020) due to CAIR alone.   
 
EPA’s health risk assessment did not demonstrate any significant health risk from 10 
tons per year of non-elemental mercury emissions, even among pregnant women who did not 
follow fish advisories.  It is theoretically possible that some risks remained at a small number 
of plants with unusual conditions, since the EPA models were regional in coverage and did 
not have fine precision very close to plants.  However, under CAMR, rare instances of 
localized risk can be addressed by state and local regulators.   
 
EPA and OIRA ultimately agreed that the case for strict controls at every plant was 
weak, especially after the effects of CAIR were considered.  The policy debate then shifted to 
whether the U.S. should make a significant economic investment, beyond CAIR, to further 
reduce our nation’s contribution to the global pool of mercury. 
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U.S. power plants contribute to the global mercury pool, but the best estimate is that 
the contribution in recent years was less than 5% of the global total (EPA, 2005a).  
Nevertheless, the U.S. has an interest in stimulating the development of new mercury control 
technologies that might be used worldwide to reduce the global pool.   Based on this 
rationale, which was outside a traditional benefit-cost framework, OIRA supported a national 
cap-and-trade program to reduce the mercury emissions expected to remain after CAIR.  The 
end result is that in 2020, CAMR sets a cap on national mercury emissions from power plants 
at 16 tons per year, about a 65% reduction from pre-CAIR levels, and a 53% reduction from 
post-CAIR levels.    
 
  Although the 2020 mercury cap costs about $750 million per year beyond CAIR, it has 
several qualitative benefits.  It stimulates U.S. industry to develop new mercury-control 
technologies that can reduce emissions of elemental mercury.  As new technologies are 
commercialized, they can be used throughout the world as well as in the United States.  As 
CAMR reduces further the U.S. contribution to the global mercury pool, other countries may 
be more readily persuaded that they should reduce their contributions to the global pool.  
CAMR also makes a contribution to reducing non-elemental mercury emissions (from 10 to 7 
tons per year).  The combination of CAIR and CAMR reduces non-elemental mercury 
emissions by 68%, providing an extra measure of assurance that pregnant women living 
downwind of power plants are protected.  Although this benefit could not be quantified, 
CAMR was considered a precautionary investment with a plausible fairness rationale.   
 
Objections to Emissions Trading 
 
Some commentators object to the idea of allowing power plants to trade mercury 
allowances (Heinzerling and Steinzor, 2004).  They argue that “hot spots” may result near 
some plants, where owners decide to buy allowances rather than spend capital to control 
mercury.  Of course, this concern is valid only if pregnant woman happen to live downwind at 
points of high deposition where large amounts of locally-caught fish are ingested regularly.   
 
OIRA and EPA economists argued that market forces are likely to reduce rather than 
increase any “hot spots” that now exist.  Economies of scale in pollution control are greatest 
at the largest plants, those that emit the most mercury and have the most local mercury 
deposition.  If the average plant reduces mercury emissions by 70%, even larger percentage 
reductions will occur at the large power plants.  Moreover, the permission to trade is likely to 
cause disproportionate reductions in non-elemental mercury, since it is easier and cheaper to 
control than elemental mercury.  If, for some unexpected reason, “hot spots” do occur at 
some plants, state and local authorities have adequate authority to set more stringent 
standards for those plants.  In fact, some states are already setting standards that are more 
stringent than CAMR (Adams, 2006).    
 
In the final analysis, the $750 million annual cost of the CAMR rule was supported by 
OIRA and EPA on the basis of qualitative benefits that could not be monetized.  The rule 
should certainly be revisited as more is understood about the benefits and costs of controlling 
mercury.  Some analysts believe a more stringent rule may be supportable by new science 
indicating mercury intake is related to elevated risks of heart attacks among adults (Rice and 
Hammitt, 2005).  The rule may have to be revisited sooner rather than later if it does not 
survive the barrage of litigation that has been launched against it. 
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TAKING STOCK OF OIRA’S PRO-REGULATION HISTORY 
 
            OIRA’s proactive stances on trans fats, diesel-engine exhaust, vehicle fuel economy 
and coal-plant pollution were unusual by historic standards.  The early years of OIRA’s 
history were dominated by efforts to reduce regulatory burdens on industry (Morrison, 1986, 
Percival, 1991).  Yet, OIRA’s support of sound rules in the 2001-2006 period was certainly 
not unprecedented.   
 
  In fact, OIRA’s role in diesel-exhaust control is reminiscent of the accelerated phase-
out of leaded gasoline that occurred early in the Reagan Administration.  In that case, 
industry came to President Reagan’s “regulatory relief” task force seeking a delay of the ban 
on leaded gasoline that President Carter’s EPA had issued.  Instead the Reagan OIRA was 
ultimately persuaded to sign on to the opposite course:  an acceleration of the lead phase 
out.  The pivotal input was a careful benefit-cost analysis by EPA analysts, including review 
and support by OIRA (McGarity, 1991; Morgenstern, 1997; Gray et al, 1997).   
 
           In the Clinton years, OIRA also made important pro-regulation accomplishments.  For 
example, OIRA effectively resisted a determined effort by DOT to weaken the automobile 
airbag requirement.  In the face of public outcry from libertarians and citizens who feared the 
explosive device, DOT sought OIRA approval for a modified rule that would have placed a 
manual on-off switch in every new vehicle produced with an airbag.  OIRA blocked this 
proposal on the grounds that the safety harms from a misused on-off switch might be vastly 
greater than the benefits.  Once drivers and front-seat passengers were informed about the 
benefits and risks of airbags and safety belts through a massive education effort, public 
acceptance of the technology improved considerably (Graham, 2001). 
 
  What was different about OIRA in the George W. Bush years was OIRA’s proactive 
role in the priority setting process.  In addition to serving as an end-of-the-pipeline 
mechanism for quality control, OIRA became a determined participant in the formulation 
stage of policy making.   
 
            OIRA’s pro-regulation accomplishments in the 2001-2006 period also underscore a 
lesson that has been repeated throughout OIRA’s 25-year history:  Careful economic analysis 
sometimes suggests that more federal regulation is a wiser public policy than less federal 
regulation (Smith, 1984; Mendeloff, 1988; McGarity, 1991; Breyer, 1993; Sunstein 2002).  
Regardless of whether OIRA is working in a conservative or liberal administration, this is an 
essential feature of “smart regulation” based on science and economics. 
 
            The diesel-exhaust and coal-plant rulemakings also highlight why it is important for 
OIRA to be capable of scrutinizing claims of benefits as well as costs.  In retrospect, one of 
my best personnel moves at OIRA was to recruit the office’s first toxicologist and 
epidemiologist, in addition to new specialists in engineering and health policy.  The new 
experts joined OIRA’s economists and statisticians as the office began to delve more deeply 
into the technical aspects of regulatory benefit estimates (OMB, 2002).  Although we 
respected the views of agency experts, we began to ask more penetrating questions about 
how benefits were determined. 
 
            In the diesel-exhaust rulemaking, we did not accept at face value the huge benefit 
estimates prepared by EPA in collaboration with their science advisors.  We recognized that   19
there was considerable imprecision (and possible bias) in the EPA estimates and thus 
instructed EPA to prepare an alternative benefit analysis based on more pessimistic 
assumptions.  When we learned that even the alternative benefit estimates supported EPA’s 
policy, we became even more determined advocates of EPA’s position in the White House.   
 
The benefit story was much more complex for pollution from coal plants.  After 
persistent probing of EPA over several years, we became convinced that tighter controls on 
sulfur emissions promised much greater benefits than tighter controls on mercury emissions, 
even though the mass media and some activist groups often portrayed mercury as the worst 
of all pollutants.  The position we advocated needs to be re-evaluated in the years ahead as 
more scientific knowledge is obtained about both sulfur and mercury emissions from coal 
plants. 
 
            The CAFE rulemaking illustrates why it is important for OIRA analysts to remain 
engaged on an important issue, even if the “first-best” policy is rejected.  In the George W. 
Bush administration and in the Congress, higher fuel taxes or new carbon taxes were dead 
on arrival, even though some economists in the administration saw them as the best course 
for public policy.   
 
  Rather than give up on energy conservation, OIRA worked persistently with multiple 
agencies, including the Council of Economic Advisers, to improve federal fuel economy 
regulation and create consumer tax credits for purchase of vehicles with innovative fuel-
saving technologies.  Coupled with the sustained rise of fuel prices, these “second-best” 
policies appear to be stimulating a market dynamic in favor of more hybrid engines, more 
advanced diesel technology and more light-weight construction materials.  The resulting 
technological innovations provide a solid foundation for more ambitious national or 
international policies to promote energy security and slow the pace of climate change.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
           Each year OMB publishes agency estimates of regulatory costs and benefits.  These 
data show that during my tenure as OIRA Administrator, the overall net benefits from 
regulation were larger than was experienced in the 1990s (see Table 1).  In part, this 
occurred because we cut the growth rate of costly major rules by 49% compared to the 1990s 
(OMB, 2004; 2005; 2007a; 2007b).  But we also encouraged rulemakings with impressive 
benefits, causing average yearly benefits from major rules to increase 108% compared to the 
1990s (OMB, 2007a,b).   
 
Table 1 
Total Net Benefits from 
Major Federal Rules, 1992-2005 
(in billions of 2001 dollars) 
 
Year  Benefits  Costs  Net Benefits 
1992 81.1  16.3  64.8 
1993 7.7  8.1  -0.4 
1994 11.4  8.7  2.7 
1995 3.1  3.5  -0.4 
1996 19.6  2.6  17.0   20
1997 2.5  2.4  0.1 
1998 12.8  5.4  7.4 
1999 15.9  8.4  7.5 
2000 35.1  17.9  17.2 
2001 0.0  -4.8  4.8 
2002 4.3  1.9  2.4 
2003 3.1  2.5  0.6 
2004 52.2  6.8  45.4 
2005 74.0  5.6  68.4 
2006 26.0  2.5  23.5 
 
Notes:   Figures for 1992 and 2000 include rules issued prior to the presidential inauguration 
in the next year. Based on 134 major federal rules where agencies produced estimates of 
benefits and costs.  All figues are annualized.  Sources: OMB 2007a,b. 
 
 
  Overall, the quantified net benefit of major rules from 2001 to 2005 increased by 280% 
compared to the 1990s (OMB, 2007b).  Fewer major rules were issued, but those that were 
issued had superior benefit-cost justifications.   One of the key lessons is that we should 
judge regulators not by the number of rules they issue, but by their overall contribution to 
social welfare (Sunstein, 2002; Adler and Posner, 2006).  
 
  Reviewing major new rules was a big challenge, but modernizing the sea of existing 
federal regulations was an even bigger chore (Crain, 2005).  Since OMB began to keep 
records in 1981, an additional 20,000 new federal rules have been adopted (OMB, 2007).  
For the vast majority of these rules, the regulator has never looked back to determine what 
the rule accomplished or how expensive it was.  Thus, at the same time that OIRA worked to 
enhance the efficiency of new rules, we also instructed regulators to reexamine and 
streamline about 100 existing regulations, the first serious “look-back” effort since the early 
Reagan years (OMB, 2003; 2004; 2007).     
 
  What surprised some, however, was how frequently our office made a pro-regulation 
argument to regulators, to White House staff, to the Vice President’s office and even to the 
President himself.  Before coming to government, I had discovered that public health 
regulators suffer from a syndrome of paranoia and neglect:  excessive regulation of some 
risks, inadequate regulation of others (Graham, 1997).  Past practice at OIRA had focused on 
the first part of this problem, but OIRA had not yet begun to tackle the second part, a 
longstanding concern of progressive regulatory scholars (Breyer, 1993; Sunstein, 2002; 
Bagley and Revesz, 2006).  I am pleased to have begun an effort at OIRA to address this 
imbalance.   
 
Unfortunately, the benefit-cost framework for regulatory reform is only as powerful as 
the tools and data available to implement the framework.  Based on my five years of 
experience overseeing federal regulatory agencies, I have become even more convinced 
than I was previously of the need for our nation to make expanded research investments in 
regulatory economics, science, and engineering.  The information base on which we made 
multi-billion dollar decisions was often remarkably slim.  Hence, I conclude this paper with 
several examples of the urgent need for research. 
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            First, environmental regulators assume that each statistical life extended by reducing 
air pollution should be valued at $6 million (EPA, 2004; 2005a).  This figure was a crucial 
input to the benefit assessments for both the diesel-engine and coal-plant rulemakings.  Upon 
close inspection, the figures used in the benefit assessments were based primarily on the 
wage premiums that are necessary to attract workers into occupations with elevated risks of 
traumatic injury (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).  Although environmental economists use the 
phrase “benefit transfer” to describe this form of extrapolation, it would be more useful if 
regulatory analysts had some relevant data on the public’s economic demand for improved 
air quality.  That is a challenging research question, but one that would be very worthwhile to 
study directly with innovative research designs and hard data.   
 
            Second, the estimated air-quality benefits are based on another crucial assumption:  
that all fine particles are equally toxic, regardless of their size or chemical composition.  Yet 
there are sound toxicological reasons to suspect that sulfates, nitrates and carbon-containing 
particles vary considerably in their toxicity at low concentrations.  Moreover, the 
epidemiologic evidence that currently links air pollution and adverse health outcomes has 
progressed only modestly beyond what Lester Lave and colleagues published in the early 
1970s (Lave and Seskin, 1970).  Much of the recent literature does not make use of the 
modern econometric tools that are now considered standard in economics.  I would like to 
see the next generation of environmental epidemiology studies be produced by teams of 
analysts that include physicians, toxicologists, environmental scientists, statisticians and 
econometricians.  The future stakes in regulatory policy – whether measured in public health 
or monetary terms – justify new kinds of scientific collaborations. 
 
            Finally, we need better economic models of how consumers and producers in the 
automotive industry will respond to a multiplicity of federal and state regulations, higher fuel 
prices, tax policies, and a major restructuring of the industry.  A key question is what products 
will arise from a U.S. automotive market with fuel prices below European experience ($4-5 
per gallon) but considerably above the U.S. experience of the 1990s ($1 - $2 per gallon).  As 
energy-security and climate-change concerns intensify over the next decade, there will be 
numerous policy proposals aimed at the world transport sector.  Unless our economic models 
of the global auto industry improve considerably, much of this policymaking will be based on 
guesswork.  I believe our universities, think tanks and government policy shops are capable 
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